We the Peoples: Civil Society, the UN
and Global Governance
Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society
Relationships
In producing this brief introduction to the Report, the 6-page NGLS Roundup 113 (June 2004) has been very helpful. To receive a copy, download from www.un-ngls.org or write to NGLS, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. Paragraph numbers refer to the Report itself which may be downloaded from the Panel’s website, www.un/org/reform/panel.html In addition to the Report – available in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish as well as English – the website has links to its official launch and press conference, and to details of the Panel’s meetings and consultations. There is also a transcript of the first Security Council meeting on the Role of Civil Society in post-conflict peace-building (22 June 2004). And one can access the 18-page report of the Panel’s Survey, detailing responses to 1 December 2003. We are awaiting a reply to our inquiry about the availability of the Report in hard copy.
Members of the Panel: they were appointed by the Secretary-General as independent experts, with a balance between geographic regions and gender. Collectively, they have experience in politics, government, the United Nations, civil society, academia and business. The Chair, a former President of Brazil, was Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Other members were Bagher Asadi (Iran), Manuel Castells (Spain), Birgitta Dahl (Sweden), Peggy Dulany (USA), Andre Erdos (Hungary), Malini Mehra (India), Juan Mayr (Colombia), Kumi Naidoo (South Africa), Mary Racelis (Philippines), Prakash Ratilal (Mozambique) and Aminata Traore (Mali). Their brief biographies are in Annex I of the Report, along with the Panel’s terms of reference.
Consultations and Funding: a list of their Broad and Targeted Consultations comprises Annex II. The Panel held a total of 58 consultation meetings, including one in London (17 November 2003) co-hosted by the Centre for Social Markets and the One World Trust. A list of donors and other funding sources appears in Annex III. Among the 6 contributing governments, we are glad to see our own (through DfID).
The Report gives credit to the United Nations where it is due, but does not hesitate to offer constructive criticism or to pass on criticisms received through the consultations. It affirms that “there is much to be proud of in (the UN’s) existing strategies and recent measures to enhance engagement”, adding that the Report’s proposals “are largely intended to expand, deepen and protect them not replace them.” It argues for depoliticising the accreditation process, concerned about the growing number of GONGOs. It also acknowledges the concerns of some member states about the pressure on UN meeting facilities and timetables created by the rising numbers of CSOs seeking to attend, and the perception that some CSO interventions are “offensive”. But it suggests that obstructing the application or accreditation process by “arbitrary political judgements, is not a good way to address such concerns.” (para 123). On the matter most directly relevant to UNGA-Link, the Report suggests “The United Nations should embrace an array of forums, each designed to achieve a specific outcome…” (Proposal 2); and proposes that the main constituencies the UN works with form “broad networks” to help monitor practices and revise strategies “perhaps leading to their evolution into recognised advisory groups” (Proposal 23).
Advocated Paradigm Shifts: the 30 proposals of the Report largely stem from four underlying priorities identified through the Panel’s deliberations. These are, in brief:
· The UN must…give more emphasis to convening and facilitating rather than “doing”…
· The UN must embrace a plurality of constituencies: many actors may be relevant to an issue
· The UN must connect the local with the global…
· The UN must help re-shape democracy for the 21st century… tackling the democratic deficits it is prone to, emphasising participatory democracy and deeper accountability of institutions to the global public.
Fostering Multi-Constituency Processes: the first proposal takes account of the increasing activity in recent years of non-State actors on issues including gender, climate change, debt, landmines and AIDS; and recognises that governments alone cannot resolve today’s most difficult challenges. It reads, in part:
In exercising its convening power, the UN should emphasize inclusion of all constituencies relevant to an issue, recognize that the key actors are different for different issues, foster multistakeholder partnerships to pioneer solutions and empower a range of global policy networks to innovate and build momentum on policy options…
The second proposal calls for the “array of forums” noted above, to address the current problem of overloaded agendas and meetings of barely manageable size. It suggests different modes of engagement throughout the lifecycle of an issue: first interactive high-level round tables, then global conferences to define norms and targets, multi-stakeholder partnerships to implement the new norms and targets, and multistakeholder hearings to monitor compliance, review experience and revise strategies.
Next, the Report describes the growing importance of “networked governance” in which global coalitions of constituencies that include likeminded governments, CSOs and others work together to influence policy and shape public opinion. In fields ranging from small arms to conflict diamonds, child soldiers, landmines and crimes against humanity, such coalitions have already influenced global standard and goal setting. Proposal 3 reads, in part:
The Secretariat should innovate with networked governance… It should experiment with a Global Internet Agora to survey public opinion and raise awareness… The Secretary-General should initiate multi-stakeholder advisory forums on selected emerging issues and feed their conclusions to appropriate intergovernmental forums.
Proposals 4, 5 and 6 refer to global conferences (should be used “sparingly”), convening multiconstituency public hearings “to review progress in meeting globally agreed commitments”, and to the General Assembly permitting “the carefully planned participation of other actors besides central governments in its processes” and regularly inviting “contributions by those offering high-quality independent inputs.”
Investing More in Partnerships: it is this section and the next which have most to say about the UN “connecting the local with the global” and how it could be achieved. The Panel came to see the need for a “two-way street” connecting UN norm-setting at the global level and “practical fixing” operations in particular countries. (para 35). Inspired by the success of Local Agenda 21 and some subsequent developments, Proposals 7 and 8 call for a Partnership Development Unit which should make sure that lessons of practice were “fully internalized” . This unit’s function would be
to help incubate and decentralize the partnership approach, guide the needed management shifts, ensure sound evaluations and provide support services throughout the UN…
Proposal 9 relates to engaging the private sector. The Panel recognised the wide variety of actors here, from small local enterprises and microbusinesses to large multinational companies, and said the UN needs to engage with each using different strategies, for example
Incorporating the Global Compact under the proposed Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships (see Proposal 24); …helping build the capacity and competitiveness of micro and small businesses (and) Strengthening the Global Compact’s capacity for…enhancing corporate responsibility.
Focus on the Country Level: the Panel believes that the best place to start enhancing UN-Civil Society relations and implementing global goals and norms is at country level. “Locally designed strategies… take into account local realities, cultures and priorities, they are locally owned and supported by the public, with opportunities for the involvement of elected representatives, and they are more likely to include a diversity of actors from within and outside the central Government.” (para 80). Proposals 10 and 11 relate to this theme.
Strengthening the Security Council: Roles for Civil Society – the Report notes that the UN’s “most politically sensitive organ” has greatly enhanced its informal relations with civil society in recent years (para 95). Proposal 12 suggests four ways these could be developed, referring to improvements of the Arria formula, encouraging field missions to meet local CSO leaders, having seminars at which CSO presentations and others were heard, and setting up independent commissions of inquiry to follow Council-mandated operations – perhaps a global public policy committee connected to national foreign affairs committees.
Engaging with Elected Representatives: the suggestion of having national foreign affairs committees review the outcomes of Security Council operations is one of many throughout the report which show the importance of the role the Panel hope that national parliaments, through their Standing or Select Committees and otherwise, can play in improving global governance. Paragraphs 101-116 discuss this aspect, in support of Proposals 13-16. Proposal 15 suggests that Member States
Instruct the Secretariat to work with national parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, as appropriate, to convene one or more experimental global public policy committees… (which) would comprise parliamentarians from the most relevant functional committee in a globally representative range of countries…
Proposal 16 recommends that the Secretary-General create “an institutional home” in the UN for engaging parliamentarians, on the model of the Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS). Proposals 17 and 18 relate to Local Government: respect for “local autonomy as a universal principle”, and a suggestion that the Unit described in Proposal 16 liaise with local authorities and their new world association, United Cities and Local Governments.
The remainder of the Report is no less important than what is outlined above and we hope many will take the opportunity to study it in full. Space remains only to recall Proposal 23, that the Secretariat encourage constituencies to form “broad networks”; and to note that administration of the Report’s recommendations would depend very largely on the new Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships called for in Proposal 24.